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This paper evaluates the effects of two subsidies targeted at disadvantaged pupils
in the Netherlands. The ﬁrst scheme gives primary schools with at least 70 percent
minority pupils extra funding for personnel. The second scheme gives primary
schools with at least 70 percent pupils from different disadvantaged groups extra
funding for computers and software. The cutoffs at 70 percent provide a regression
discontinuity design which we exploit in a local difference-in-differences frame-
work. For both subsidies we ﬁnd negative point estimates. For the personnel sub-
sidy these are in most cases not signiﬁcantly different from zero. For the computer
subsidy we ﬁnd more evidence of negative effects. We discuss several explanations
for these counterintuitive results.
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sion discontinuity1 Introduction
An ongoing discusion in the economics of education concerns the effect of extra re-
sources on students’ achievement. The conﬂicting views are clearly demonstrated
in recent contributions by Krueger (2003) and Hanushek (2002), that debate the
effectiveness of class-size reduction as a means to improve student achievement.
Hanushek concludes that there is little support for the effectiveness of class-size
reduction since the studies that ﬁnd positive effects do not outnumber the studies
that ﬁnd no such effect. Krueger argues that “there is no substitute for under-
standing the speciﬁcations underlying the literature and conducting well designed
experiments”, and that better studies should be given more weight in Hanushek’s
counting exercises.
The class-size debate illustrates the increasing importance that is attached to
the proper design of evaluations, and the concomitant emphasis on results based
on (quasi-) experimental research. The present study reports the results of two
quasi-experiments applicable to primary schools with a large share of disadvan-
taged pupils. The ﬁrst quasi-experiment provided an extra payment per teacher
of about 10 percent of gross salaries during two consecutive years. Only schools
where at least 70 percent of the pupils have an ethnic minority background were
eligible for this subsidy. Schools were free to spend the personnel subsidy as they
saw ﬁt, as long as it improved working conditions. They could use it (among
other things) to hire extra teachers or to give teachers an extra payment. The rel-
ative freedom schools had in spending the extra money reﬂects a current trend in
the Netherlands (and elsewhere) towards more decentralized allocation of public
spending.
The second quasi-experiment provided a one-time payment of $90 per pupil.
This money was earmarked for computers, software and language materials. Only
schools where at least 70 percent of the pupils have a disadvantaged background
1(ethnic minority or low educated parents) were eligible for this subsidy.
For both interventions the 70 percent threshold was maintained almost per-
fectly thereby creating a regression discontinuity design. The only assumption
needed to be fulﬁlled for this design to produce unbiased estimates of the effect of
a program, is that there are no confounding discontinuities at the threshold. We ex-
ploit the regression discontinuities in a local difference-in-differences framework
to identify the effect of the two programs on pupils’ achievement. To this end we
combine administrative data with data on the achievement of 8th graders in nation-
wide exams.
The policy background of both schemes is that, despite a rather generous com-
pensatory funding scheme, ethnic minority pupils and pupils with low educated
parents fare worse in school than their non-disadvantaged counterparts. The main
funding scheme for primary schools provides schools 25 percent extra funding for
pupils with low educated parents and 90 percent extra funding for pupils from an
ethnic minority. A school with all of its pupils from an ethnic minority receives
therefore almost twice as much funding as a school with all its pupils being non-
disadvantaged. In the total population of primary school pupils 18 percent have low
educated parents and 13 percent have an ethnic minority background.1 In 2000 the
total amount spent on this compensatory program was $234 million for 450,000
disadvantaged pupils. The two subsidies that we evaluate in this paper were mo-
tivated by the belief that the compensation from the main scheme is insufﬁcient,
especially for schools with a large share of disadvantaged pupils.2
1In addition to these two groups, the funding scheme also distinguishes students living in a board-
ing school or a foster home and whose parents are master of a ship, and students whose parents are
transients. Schools receive 40 and 70 percent extra funding for such students respectively. The shares
of these groups in the population are, however, negligible.
2A large number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the effects of the compensatory
element of the main funding scheme, many of these commissioned by the Dutch government. These
studies do not allow to relate changes in the achievement levels of disadvantaged students to the
funding scheme. The reason is that the funding scheme treats all students with the same social
backgroundequally. Asaresultthereisnonaturalcontrolgroup, noristhereapossibilitytoconstruct
a suitable comparison group.
2For both subsidies we ﬁnd negative point estimates. For the personnel sub-
sidy these are, however, in most cases not signiﬁcantly different from zero. For
the computer subsidy we ﬁnd more evidence of negative effects. These outcomes
indicate that neither subsidy had a substantial positive effect on pupil achievement.
Since the costs of these subsidies were substantial, both schemes therefore perform
rather poor in terms of cost-effectiveness. Notice that in both cases the treatments
that generate the non-positive effects are well-deﬁned. In the case of the personnel
subsidy the treatment is to provide schools with a speciﬁc amount of extra funding
per teacher to improve working conditions. In the case of the computer subsidy
the treatment is to give schools a speciﬁc amount of extra funding per pupil for
computers and software. We will also present evidence that schools spent the extra
money as intended.
An explanation for the poor performance of the personnel subsidy is that due
to the main funding scheme targeted schools already have sufﬁcient resources for
personnel. Perhaps schools have difﬁculty spending the extra money in an effective
way. The pupil-teacher ratio in these schools is below 14. Although schools spend
about half of the extra budget on hiring new personnel, it is unlikely that hiring
a new teacher will result in a reduction of average class-size. The other half of
the subsidy is spent on improving teachers’ remuneration and/or fringe beneﬁts.
Since this is a non-permanent increase in teachers’ salaries that is not connected to
an incentive scheme it may perhaps fail to improve teacher effort or attract better
teachers to these schools.
The non-positive effects of the computer subsidy concur with ﬁndings of other
recent studies relating to other countries, other levels of education and/or other
identiﬁcation methods. The robustness of this result suggests that computer aided
instruction may after all be an inferior mode of teaching.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
3recent studies that look at comparable interventions. Section 3 provides details of
the two programs and describes the data. Section 4 outlines the estimation strat-
egy. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical ﬁndings. The ﬁnal section
summarizes and concludes.
2 Review of related studies
2.1 Educational resources and pupils’ achievement
For about a decade the consensus amongst economists was that extra resources
have no strong or systematic impact on pupils’ achievement. Especially the survey
articles by Hanushek (1986, 1994, 1996) in which he reviews over 300 empirical
studies, have been important in this respect. Most of the studies that Hanushek
reviewed, however, use identiﬁcation methods that by current standards would
qualify as inadequate and unconvincing. Recent studies, that arguably use more
convincing identiﬁcation strategies, also ﬁnd mixed results.
Guryan (2000) uses features of an education ﬁnance equalization scheme in
Massachusetts to estimate the effect of increased spending on pupils’ achievement
at schools that are located in historically low-spending districts. For 4th graders
(but not for 8th graders) he ﬁnds improved test scores, especially for low-scoring
students. Papke(2003)exploitsasimilarequalizationschemeinMichigananduses
panel data to identify the effect on 4th grade pass rates and 7th grade math tests.
She ﬁnds that increases in spending have substantial effects on the math test pass
rate. Here, effects are largest for schools with initially poor performance. Card and
Payne (2002) analyze the effects of school ﬁnance reforms on the distribution of
school spending across richer and poorer districts. Unlike the previous two papers,
they analyze nationwide data. Card and Payne ﬁnd that equalization of spending
narrows the difference in test score outcomes across family background groups.
4A recent study that fails to ﬁnd an impact of extra resources on achievement
of (disadvantaged) pupils is Van der Klaauw (2003) who investigates how Title
I affects student achievement. Title I provides ﬁnancial support for supplemen-
tary educational services in mathematics and reading to poor and low achieving
students. Van der Klaauw evaluates the effects of Title I in a regression disconti-
nuity framework using data on New York City public schools. He ﬁnds that Title
I has not proven to be successful in improving student outcomes. He discusses
possible explanations for this ﬁnding. First there is some evidence that cities and
states substitute regular funding away from Title I schools, resulting in a limited
increase in total spending in these schools. Another explanation lies in the fact that
in practice remedial classes are relatively ineffective because they are often taught
by inexperienced teacher aides.
Another study that fails to ﬁnd effects of extra funding directed at schools with
disadvantaged students is B´ enabou et al. (2004). For France they investigate the
effect of a compensatory funding scheme in a difference-in-differences framework.
The extra funding was partly aimed at improving the pay of teachers, and partly at
increasing classroom hours of pupils. They do not ﬁnd evidence that these extra
resources improved student achievement as measured by test scores.
Thestudiesmentionedaboveallestimatetheeffectofextraresourcesonachieve-
ment thereby treating spending as a ”black box”. But where most of these studies
do not have information on the exact size of the extra resources, we do know how
much each school received thereby making the treatment very precisely deﬁned.
2.2 Computers and pupils’ achievement
The evidence on the effect of computers in schools on pupils’ achievement is lim-
ited. In their review Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998) conclude that the effect of com-
puter use on achievement is questionable. Although many of the reviewed studies
5report positive outcomes, Kirkpatrick and Cuban conclude that the value of this
research is limited because it does not take endogeneity issues into account.
Three recent studies that do address endogeneity ﬁnd zero or negative effects
of extra computers or software on achievement. Angrist and Lavy (2002) evaluate
the effects of a program in which the Israeli State Lottery funded new computers
in elementary and middle schools in Israel. They use several estimation strate-
gies (OLS and 2SLS) and ﬁnd “a consistently negative and marginally signiﬁcant
relationship between the program-induced use of computers and 4th grade Maths
scores” (p.760). For 8th graders and for scores on Hebrew, the estimated effects
are mostly negative although not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Goolsbee and Guryan (2002) report the results from a program that subsidized
schools’ investment in Internet and communications. The subsidy has a substantial
positive impact on the probability of classrooms having an Internet connection. At
the same time this increase in Internet connections has had no measurable impact
on any measure of pupil achievement.
Finally, Rouse et al. (2004) study the effects of a instructional computer pro-
gramcalledFastForWord(FFW).TheauthorsﬁndnoevidencethattheuseofFFW
results into gains in language acquisition or actual reading skills. Interestingly the
time students spent using FFW was in addition to the amount of time they spent
in regular reading instruction. Although Rouse et al. do not ﬁnd negative effects,
broader use of computers in instruction is likely to substitute regular instruction. If
computer based learning is less effective than more traditional forms of classroom
teaching, negative effects cannot be ruled out.
63 Programs and data
3.1 The two programs
In February 2000 the Dutch ministry of Education announced a personnel subsidy
for schools with at least 70 percent minority pupils.3 Eligibility was based on the
percentage of minority pupils of a school on October 1 1998 as counted in admin-
istrative data. The extra funding amounted to $2,225 per teacher in the school
year 1999-2000 and $2,440 in 2000-2001. These sums were paid in May 2000 and
March 2001. In November 2000 it turned out that the available budget for the year
2000 was not exhausted, and in December 2000 the eligible schools received an ad-
ditional $585 per teacher. The total payment equaled therefore $2,625 per teacher
per year over a two-year period. This annual amount is roughly equal to 9 percent
of the average annual gross salary of Dutch primary school teachers, and 11 per-
cent of the annual gross salary of young teachers. This is a substantial intervention,
given that personnel costs are roughly 80 percent of schools’ total budget.
Schools were free to spend the budget in ways that matched the schools’ needs,
as long as they were aiming to improve working conditions. The explanatory
memorandum that was circulated following the Ministry’s decision listed as ex-
amples: a plain ﬁnancial premium, a bonus to stimulate teachers to work extra
hours, compensations for housing costs, traveling costs or childcare facilities, and
hiring teaching assistants. Although the memorandum was ambiguous about a pos-
sible continuation of the subsidy it emphasized that the extra funding was provided
for a limited period and that obligations pertaining after this period had to be paid
from the regular budget.
Later that year, in November 2000, the ministry announced another measure,
3The formal description of this group is students with parents born in Surinam, the Netherlands
Antilles or non-English speaking countries outside Europe or whose parents are refugees, and whose
father or mother has at most completed low level vocational education or whose primary earnings
parent has a job involving physical labor or has no income from labor.
7which stipulated that schools with at least 70 percent of their pupils belonging to
any disadvantaged group (ethnic minority or low educated parents) would receive
extra funding in the amount of $90 per pupil, which is about $1250 per classroom
in the eligible schools.4 For this scheme the percentage of disadvantaged pupils
of a school was based on administrative data counted on October 1 1999. Of this
sum, $15 were earmarked for renewal of language materials, while the remaining
$75 were earmarked for computers or (education) software. The subsidy was paid
only once in December 2000.
A common feature of these two interventions is that they specify a minimum
percentage of disadvantaged pupils schools need to have to qualify for the extra
compensation. The personnel subsidy requires at least 70 percent of ethnic mi-
nority pupils, the computer subsidy requires at least 70 percent pupils from any
disadvantaged group. All treated schools received the same amount per teacher or
per pupil.
3.2 Data construction
The ministry of education provided us with data on the numbers of pupils of differ-
ent social backgrounds for all primary schools in the Netherlands counted at Octo-
ber 1, 1998 and October 1, 1999. The data also contain information about which
schools actually received extra funding. These administrative data were merged
with information about pupils’ results in nationwide tests. The data also include
information on the average social background of the school population ranging
from 1 (least disadvantaged) to 7 (most disadvantaged), the degree of urbanization
of the school area and the school’s denomination.
More than 80 percent of primary schools participate in a nationwide testing
4Formally a pupil’s parents are low educated if one parent has at most an education at the lowest
level of vocational education.
8round.5 All pupils who are in the highest (8th) grade make a standardized test that
covers four areas:
• Language: spelling, writing, reading and vocabulary;
• Arithmetic: understanding of numbers, mental arithmetic, percentages, frac-
tions, dealing with measures, weights, money and time;
• Information processing: use of texts and other information sources, reading
and understanding of tables, graphs and maps;
• World orientation (optional): applying knowledge in the ﬁelds of geography,
history, biology, science and form of government.
Testing takes place during three days in February. The complete test consists of
over 200 multiple-choice questions. Pupils’ scores on this test are used for the
assignment of pupils to different levels of secondary schools. Many secondary
schools apply strict thresholds to admit pupils to the more advanced types of sec-
ondary education. This gives pupils an incentive to perform well on this test. Fur-
thermore, the average scores of schools’ pupils are currently used as information to
judge the quality of primary schools. These average scores are public information
and parents use it in their choice of primary school. This gives schools an incen-
tive to prepare their pupils well for the test. To illustrate the importance of the test,
every year all national newspapers as well as national television pay special atten-
tion to it. The impression often is, that preparing and making this test is the main
activity of pupils in their last two years in primary school (7th and 8th grade).
For our analysis we use data of the test scores from pre-intervention years 1999
and 2000 and from post-intervention years 2002 and 2003.6 In the empirical anal-
5For the samples we use in the analysis we do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant differences in
test participation between schools above and below the thresholds.
6We do not use data from 2001 because it is unclear whether this is a pre- or a post-intervention
year.
9Table 1: Timing of events
October 1 1998 Reference date for personnel subsidy
February 1999 Nationwide test 1999
October 1 1999 Reference date for ICT subsidy
February 2000 Nationwide test 2000
February 2000 Decision and announcement personnel subsidy
May 2000 Payment of $2,225 per teacher as personnel subsidy
November 2000 Decision and announcement ICT subsidy
November 2000 Decision and announcement of extra payment personnel subsidy
December 2000 Payment of $90 per pupil as ICT subsidy
December 2000 Extra payment of $585 per teacher
March 2001 Payment of $2,440 per teacher as personnel subsidy
February 2002 Nationwide test 2002
February 2003 Nationwide test 2003
ysis, the scores of schools’ pupils on the language, arithmetic and information
processing parts serve as the outcome variables. To standardize the estimated ef-
fects, the scores are divided by their standard deviations and normalized to mean
zero relative to the whole population.
Table 1 gives an overview of the timing of the relevant events. It is clear
from the table that the tests of February 1999 and February 2000 took place be-
fore schools received extra funding. The 2003 (2002) test took place almost three
(two) years after the ﬁrst payment of the personnel subsidy, more than two (one)
years after the extra payment of the personnel subsidy, and the payment of the com-
puter subsidy, and almost two (one) years after the payment of the last tranche of
the personnel subsidy. We use the 2002 and 2003 test scores as relevant outcome
measures for both subsidies.
In 1998 there were 7,045 primary schools in the Netherlands. Of these schools,
in total 270 (4%) had at least 70 percent of their pupils belonging to an ethnic mi-
nority group thereby qualifying for the personnel subsidy. Out of these 270 there
were 267 schools that actually received the personnel subsidy.7 Seven schools
with less than 70 percent of their pupils belonging to the ethnic minority cate-
7The 3 schools not receiving the personnel subsidy had shares of ethnic minority students equal
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Figure 1: Distribution of schools
gory (mistakingly) received this subsidy.8 Considering the computer subsidy there
were 7,028 primary schools in 1999, of which 564 (8%) had at least 70 percent
of their pupils belonging to any disadvantaged group in 1999. 551 of these 564
schools received the computer subsidy.9 Sixteen schools with less than 70 percent
of their pupils belonging to any disadvantaged group (mistakingly) received this
subsidy.10 We do not know the reasons for the misclassiﬁcations. Section 4 de-
scribes how schools that received the extra funding while not eligible (and vice
versa), are treated in the analysis.
In our identiﬁcation setup one might be concerned that schools anticipated
the subsidies and accordingly manipulated their relevant shares of disadvantaged
pupils to become eligible. This seems unlikely since they would have needed to
8The shares of ethnic minority students at these 7 schools are: 0.69, 0.69, 0.68, 0.67, 0.64, 0.58,
and 0.34.
9The 13 schools not receiving the personnel subsidy had shares of disadvantaged students equal
to: 0.71, 0.75, 0.76, 0.89, 0.92, 0.93, 0.93, 0.94, 0.95, 0.96, 0.97 and 1 (twice).
10The shares of disadvantaged students at these 16 schools are: 0.39, 0.43, 0.48, 0.56, 0.56, 0.57,
0.58, 0.61, 0.65, 0.67, 0.67, 0.67, 0.68, 0.69, 0.69 and 0.69.
11anticipate the personnel subsidy by one-and-a-half year and the computer subsidy
by one year. Nevertheless, one check of such manipulation is to compare the distri-
bution of schools around the cutoff level. Manipulation would lead to a drop below
the 70 percent cutoff and a rise just above. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribu-
tions of schools in the range of 10 percent around the cutoff levels of 70 percent.
Thesedistributions giveno indicationofsuch manipulationthereby conﬁrmingthat
schools did not anticipate the implementation of the two programs.
Schools that have at least 70 percent minority pupils in 1998 are also very
likely to have at least 70 percent disadvantaged pupils in 1999. In other words,
schools that qualify for the personnel subsidy are also very likely to qualify for the
computer subsidy. In the empirical analysis we focus on schools with their shares
of minority pupils or disadvantaged pupils at most 10 percentage points away from
the 70 percent thresholds. Within these subsamples nearly all schools that qualify
for the personnel subsidy also qualify for the computer subsidy and almost no
school that qualiﬁes for the computer subsidy qualiﬁes for the personnel subsidy.
4 Empirical strategy
This section discusses the empirical strategy used to identify the effect of the two
subsidies. The discussion is phrased in terms of the personnel subsidy. The ap-
proach for identiﬁcation of the effect of the computer subsidy is identical. We
ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the standard (sharp) regression discontinuity design, and then
describe how this is exploited in the analysis.
4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
The eligibility rule of the personnel subsidy speciﬁes that all schools with at least
70 percent minority pupils receive the subsidy and all schools with less than 70
12percent minority pupils do not receive the subsidy. Without exceptions to this rule
we would have a so-called sharp regression discontinuity design in which treatment
depends in a deterministic way on the share of minority pupils.11
To estimate the effect of the treatment we can compare the average outcome
of the group just above the threshold with the average outcome of the group just
belowthethreshold. Thisgivesanunbiasedestimateoftheaveragetreatmenteffect
for schools with 70 percent of disadvantaged pupils if there are no confounding
discontinuities at the threshold.
Denote the share of minority pupils in school j in 1998 by s98
j . With a sharp
regression discontinuity design the variable denoting treatment, d98











The outcome can be written as
E[yj] = α+δd98
j
where α ≡ E[y0j] is the (average) test score without the subsidy, and δ ≡ E[y1j]−
E[y0j] is the change in test scores due to the subsidy. Under the assumption of a
common treatment effect, it can be shown that δ can be identiﬁed by (cf. Hahn
et al., 2001):
δ = y+− y−
where y+ ≡ lims↓0.7 E[y|s] and y− ≡ lims↑0.7 E[y|s]. The major identifying as-
sumption is that there are no other discontinuities around 0.7. This is an exclusion
restriction with respect to the discontinuity.
11Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) provide a recent application of the sharp regression discontinuity
design.
134.2 Estimation
Although we could exploit the regression discontinuity in the standard way, and
compare schools around the discontinuity, we follow a difference-in-differences
strategy to increase the power and obtain more precise estimates.12 In terms of
implementation we estimate ﬁxed effect regressions of the following form
yijt = α+δ·(D98
ij ×mt)+γ · D98
ij +τ ·mt +ηj +φjt+εijt (1)
where yijt is the test score of pupil i in school j in year t, and D98
ij is a zero-
one indicator variable which equals one if school j received the subsidy, ηj is
a school ﬁxed effect, φjt is a school-cohort (class) random effect, mt are time
effects (dummies) and εijt is an i.i.d. error term. Note that the estimate of δ in
(1) recuperates the standard difference-in-differences estimate when restricting the
sample to one post-intervention and one pre-intervention year. Below we estimate
(1) on a sample of two pre-intervention and two post-intervention years.
In a standard regression discontinuity design one compares observations just
below the cutoff to observations just above it. Although we calculate difference-
in-differences estimates we will estimate them locally and exploit the discontinuity
to add to the credibility of the common trend assumption that is necessary for
difference-in-differences estimates.
For this purpose we construct so-called discontinuity samples. The x percent
Discontinuity Sample (DS±x) consists of the eligible group of schools with their
percentage of minority pupils at most x percent above the cutoff of 70 percent, and
the non-eligible group of schools with their percentage of minority pupils at most
x percent below the cutoff of 70 percent. Widening the bandwidths around the
discontinuity increases the number of observations but at the same time increases
12Estimation in levels does not lead to different conclusions, but gives much less precise estimates.
14theriskthatthecommontrendassumptionisviolated. Intheanalysis, wewillwork
with DS±5 and DS±10. These samples are relatively close to the discontinuity and
include sufﬁcient schools to obtain meaningful results.
An additional advantage of the difference-in-differences estimation is that it
also addresses imperfect compliance. As mentioned in the previous section, a few
schools did receive the personnel subsidy although they had less than 70 percent
minority pupils. Because the rule behind these exceptions is unknown (at least to
us), this breaks down the sharp regression discontinuity design. There is no longer
a deterministic relation between treatment and the share of minority pupils.
Shadish et al. (2002) suggest to either retain the misclassiﬁed cases in the anal-
ysis and classify them according to their eligibility status rather than by the their
treatment status, or to eliminate misassigned observations from the analysis. The
ﬁrst solution does not give an estimate of the treatment effect of interest while the
second solution appears to be somewhat ad hoc and does not give an estimate of a
well deﬁned effect.
The advantage of the difference-in-differences strategy is that it eliminates the
potential bias arising from imperfect compliance if this is captured by time in-
variant unobserved school effects. As a check, we also estimated 2SLS equations
where the dependent variable is the change in test scores over time, while instru-
menting treatment with eligibility. This gave very similar point estimates, and we
could not reject equality with the difference-in-differences estimates. Since the
latter procedure gives more precise estimates we will present these below.
15Table 2: Sample means for population and estimation samples, 2002
Personnel Computer
Population DS±5D S ±10 DS±5D S ±10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Language 0.000 -0.538 -0.587 -0.428 -0.442
(s.d.) (1.000) (1.058) (1.048) (1.062) (1.065)
Arithmetics 0.000 -0.343 -0.412 -0.318 -0.320
(s.d.) (1.000) (1.074) (1.081) (1.057) (1.063)
Information 0.000 -0.549 -0.602 -0.441 -0.423
(s.d.) (1.000) (1.107) (1.083) (1.086) (1.089)
Share minority 1998 (s98) 0.125 0.693 0.696 0.362 0.362
Share disadvantaged 1999 (s99) 0.294 0.835 0.852 0.695 0.688
Socio-economic index
-1 (least disadvantaged) 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-2 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-3 0.311 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.017
-4 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.155 0.204
-5 0.093 0.010 0.008 0.458 0.421
-6 0.038 0.526 0.482 0.363 0.305
-7 (most disadvantaged) 0.048 0.464 0.509 0.000 0.052
Urbanization school area
-Very High 0.150 0.738 0.696 0.520 0.422
-High 0.227 0.184 0.197 0.241 0.286
-Median 0.210 0.051 0.067 0.111 0.131
-Modest 0.249 0.023 0.031 0.094 0.100
-Low/None 0.164 0.004 0.009 0.034 0.060
School denomination
-Public 0.316 0.568 0.512 0.364 0.460
-Catholic 0.355 0.206 0.252 0.343 0.303
-Protestant 0.267 0.167 0.195 0.263 0.203
-Montessori/Daltonian 0.053 0.023 0.022 0.031 0.026
-Other 0.010 0.036 0.019 0.000 0.008
Number of pupils 150821 1817 3392 3954 8263
Number of schools 5938 63 124 150 328
165 Results
5.1 Data description
Before turning to the main results of this paper this section ﬁrst describes the data.
Table 2 shows the sample means in 2002 for the estimation samples, and how they
compare to the whole population of pupils. Since the effects we estimate are local
effects it is important to know how these samples compare to the population as a
whole.
As seen in the ﬁrst three rows of column (1), we standardized the test scores
to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the population. Compared to the
average student, the pupils in the schools around the personnel discontinuity score
on average more than half a standard deviation lower on both the language and
information processing test. Performance in arithmetics is about one third of a
standard deviation lower in these schools compared to the population average.
For the local samples around the computer eligibility discontinuity, test scores
for language and information processing are more than 0.4 of a standard deviation
below the population average. For arithmetics the difference is somewhat above
0.3 of a standard deviation. The fact that only the language and information pro-
cessingscoresandnotthearithmeticsscoresofthepersonneldiscontinuitysamples
are worse than those of the computer discontinuity samples, reﬂects that minority
pupils do worse on language and information processing than Dutch disadvantaged
students but not on arithmetics.
The schools that are (almost) eligible for the personnel subsidy are in the two
most disadvantaged groups of the socio-economic classiﬁcation index of the school
population, whereas the schools in the computer subsidy sample have on average
less disadvantaged students. To compare, in the whole population the vast majority
of the schools have students from the three least disadvantaged categories.
17Table 2 also shows that the more disadvantaged the student population the more
likely the school is situated in one of the major cities. About 70% of the students in
schoolsaroundthepersonneldiscontinuityliveinoneofthemajorcities, compared
to 50% for the computer subsidy sample, and only 15% of the total population.
Finally, minority pupils are more likely to attend public schools. The bottom
panel in columns (2) and (3) shows that more than half of these pupils are in public
schools compared to 32% in the population. In contrast, the denomination of the
schools that ﬁnd themselves around the qualifying discontinuity for the computer
subsidy is quite similar to those in the population.13
To see how test scores vary with individual and school characteristics, table 3
presents the results from an OLS regression. Column (1) shows that girls score on
average one ﬁfth of a standard deviation higher on the language test, whereas on
the arithmetics test boys do better (column 2). The difference between boys and
girls is larger on the arithmetics test than on the language test. There are no gender
differences on the information processing test.
As expected, socio-economic background strongly correlates with achieve-
ment. Pupils at schools with the most disadvantaged backgrounds score on average
a full standard deviation lower than pupils at non-disadvantaged schools. This dif-
ference is smaller on the arithmetics test where the gap amounts to two-thirds of a
standard deviation.
Interestingly, students in Catholic schools do better than students in public or
protestant schools. This is a well known ﬁnding for the United States. However,
table 3 shows that pupils in schools based on an educational principle such as
Montessori, or Daltonian do even better, while students in the residual category
score even a quarter of a standard deviation higher than students in public schools.
13We tested whether treatment and control schools were different with respect to denomination
and urbanisation. We did this for all four of our estimation samples. Out of the 8 tests we only
rejected equality for urbanisation in the DS±10 for the computer subsidy.




Girl 0.198 −0.334 −0.041
(0.040)( 0.042)( 0.039)
Socio-economic index
-1 (least disadvantaged) reference reference reference
-2 −0.090 −0.066 −0.078
(0.016)( 0.016)( 0.015)
-3 −0.236 −0.176 −0.224
(0.016)( 0.017)( 0.016)
-4 −0.431 −0.340 −0.422
(0.022)( 0.022)( 0.021)
-5 −0.508 −0.374 −0.492
(0.021)( 0.021)( 0.020)
-6 −0.762 −0.564 −0.750
(0.028)( 0.028)( 0.027)
-7 (most disadvantaged) −0.998 −0.656 −1.000
(0.027)( 0.028)( 0.026)
School denomination
-Public reference reference reference
-Catholic 0.077 0.092 0.072
(0.011)( 0.011)( 0.011)
-Protestant 0.008 −0.012 −0.025
(0.012)( 0.012)( 0.011)
-Montessori/Daltonian 0.145 0.098 0.123
(0.021)( 0.022)( 0.020)
-Other 0.249 0.302 0.227
(0.046)( 0.047)( 0.044)
Urbanization school area
-Very high 0.056 0.013 −0.014
(0.018)( 0.019)( 0.017)
-High 0.017 −0.001 −0.033
(0.015)( 0.015)( 0.014)
-Median 0.026 −0.000 −0.011
(0.015)( 0.015)( 0.014)
-Modest 0.007 0.000 −0.007
(0.014)( 0.014)( 0.013)
-Low/None reference reference reference
Constant 0.101 0.315 0.254
(0.027)( 0.028)( 0.026)
R-squared 0.35 0.22 0.38
Number of pupils 150061 150061 150061
Number of schools 5896 5896 5896
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust and take into account
clustering at the school level.
19It should be noted that these numbers are correlations and that the regression only
limitedly controls for parental background through the school population index.
It seems therefore likely that these coefﬁcients pick up unobserved background
characteristics.
5.2 Effects of personnel subsidy
Table 4 reports the ﬁndings for the personnel subsidy on the three outcome vari-
ables language, arithmetic and information processing for the ±5% and ±10%
samples around the discontinuity. We report the effects for the post intervention
years 2002 and 2003 separately since, strictly speaking, these are different out-
comes. We also report a pooled estimate for 2002 and 2003 which is more precise,
and the statistic of the test for equality of the effects for the separate years.
First consider the results on the language test for the 5% discontinuity sample.
All estimated effects are negative and of comparable size. Equality between 2002
and 2003 cannot be rejected and the pooled estimate of the effect of the personnel
subsidy on language scores is -0.069. The effects for the subsample with a wider
bandwidth around the discontinuity, DS±10, are very similar. They are slightly
more negative in 2003 than in 2002. The pooled estimate is -0.055 with a standard
error of 0.043. We can therefore rule out effects on language scores in excess of
3% of a standard deviation with a 95% probability.
For the arithmetics scores a very similar pattern emerges. All point estimates
have a negative sign, although none of the effects is signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Close around the discontinuity we obtain identical point estimates, for 2002
and 2003. Increasing the sample to DS±10, the point estimate is basically zero in
2002 while for 2003 it is very close to the initial estimate of -0.05. Using this latter



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21For the scores on the information processing items, we ﬁnd quite large negative
effects for DS±5 which are all signiﬁcantly different from zero. Increasing the
bandwidth around the cutoff to 10 percent reduces the size of estimated effects
considerably. For 2002 the effect disappears while for 2003, although the point
estimate is reduced by a factor two, it still is -0.073.
Results are fairly robust to changes in the outcome measure and the exact dis-
continuity sample. It should be noted that different effect estimates for different
outcome variables and different years cannot be ruled out. An extra teaching assis-
tant, forexample, mayaffectlanguageskillsdifferentlythanarithmeticproﬁciency.
Similarly, effects may vary over time following the hiring of extra personnel.
Although never very different, effect estimates for different discontinuity sam-
ples vary somewhat in a few cases. It should be noted that increasing the band-
width around the discontinuity makes observations less comparable. However, in
all cases the estimates obtained from DS±10 fall within the 95 percent conﬁdence
interval of the DS±5 estimates.
Summarizing, all (but one) point estimates of the effects of the personnel sub-
sidy are negative. In addition, comparing the estimates between years, there is
some evidence that the negative effects are not short-term effects. If anything, they
seem to be more negative in 2003 than in the previous year. These results show
that it is quite unlikely that the personnel subsidy had a substantial positive impact
on pupils’ achievement measured on any of the three domains covered by the tests.
Our results contrast with those reported by others. Guryan for example esti-
mates that a 10 percent increase in resources increase 4th graders test scores by
about 20% of a standard deviation. Greenwald et al. (1996), who perform a meta
analysis of (among other things) expenditures per-pupil on test scores using 27
estimates from 14 studies, ﬁnd (recalculating all expenditures in 1994 dollars for
all the studies) that a 10 percent increase in resources generate about 15% standard
22deviation higher test scores. Given these previous results, with effect sizes between
15% and 20% of a standard deviation, our estimates are very informative since we
can rule out much smaller effects.
A very important difference between the circumstances analyzed, is that in the
US situation the extra resources were given to schools with relatively few resources
whereas in the Dutch situation the extra funds come on top of an already generous
compensatory funding scheme. It seems as if the additional resources for disad-
vantaged primary schools in the Netherlands have reached some threshold point
representing resource adequacy (cf. Burtless 1996, p.19).
5.3 Effects of computer subsidy
Table 5 repeats the analysis of the previous subsection, but now for the computer
subsidy.
Considering ﬁrst the effects of the computer subsidy on language scores in
DS±5, we ﬁnd point estimates which are negative, but not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. Increasing the bandwidth to 10 percent increases the precision of the
estimates, which become somewhat more negative. As a result, the negative effects
are now statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Equality between the 2002 and
2003 effects cannot be rejected and the pooled estimate is -0.079 with a standard
error of 0.030 and is therefore signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Based on DS±5, the results for the effects on the arithmetics test score are very
similar. The effect in 2002 is very close to the one for 2003 and equality cannot be
rejected. The pooledestimate is-0.072 ofa standarddeviation witha standarderror
0.047, this rules out positive effects in excess of 2% of a standard deviation with
95 percent conﬁdence. Increasing the bandwidth does not substantially change
the picture. The effect is more negative (and signiﬁcant) in 2003 than in 2002,
suggesting that the negative effect is not a short term phenomenon. The pooled
23estimate of -0.061 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The estimates for information processing are all negative but not statistically
signiﬁcant. The size of the effects is smaller than those on the language and arith-
metic domains. The pooled estimate for DS±10 rules out positive effects larger
than 3% of a standard deviation with 95 percent likelihood.
Our ﬁndings for the effects of the computer subsidy indicate that extra funds
for computers and software do not have a positive impact on pupils’ achievement
and even seem to have a negative effect on language and arithmetics scores. This
ﬁnding accords with results from the other recent studies cited in subsection 2.2.
5.4 First stage relations
The analysis so far deals with the effects of the subsidies on pupils’ achievement.
Like in most policy evaluations, our estimates are not informative about the un-
derlying process that translates subsidies into outcomes. However, from a policy
perspective these estimates are very relevant since they inform policy makers about
the effect of providing extra resources on the ultimate outcomes of interest.
Nevertheless, one might be interested in how schools actually used the pro-
vided subsidies, where it should be noted that it is difﬁcult to draw strong conclu-
sions from this information. This is because how schools allocate money over the
different spending categories is obviously a choice variable. Different schools will
make different choices depending on their needs. Comparing pupils’ achievement
between schools that spent the subsidy in different ways to do causal inference is
therefore problematic.
Tolearnmoreabouttheanatomyofspending, descriptiveinformationonschool
spending is interesting, if only to establish that schools actually spent the extra
money. In this subsection we present therefore information about how schools


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 6: Allocation of personnel subsidy
%
Hiring and recruitment of extra personnel 36
Teacher training 5




Source: Beerends and van der Ploeg (2001).
by other researchers, for the computer subsidy we sent out a brief questionnaire to
all schools in DS±5.
Personnel spending
Beginningof2001theDutchministryofeducationcommissionedaresearchproject
to gather information about the personnel subsidy. To this end Beerends and Van
der Ploeg (2001) contacted the (vice-) principals of all 285 schools that were el-
igible for the subsidy, in order to have a telephonic interview. Ultimately, they
received responses from 65 school principals, who answered questions about how
they actually allocated the personnel subsidy.
Table 6 reports the budget shares of different categories. This reveals that large
shares of the subsidy were allocated to the hiring and recruitment of new (tempo-
rary) personnel and extra payments. Our interpretation of Table 6 is that schools
spent almost the entire subsidy as it was intended. The ﬁrst four categories are
clearly consistent with the program’s requirement of ”improving working condi-
tions”. Also the category ”other” is not inconsistent with this requirement. Only
the 12 percent that goes to the category reservations may not contribute to any es-
timated impact of the subsidy. It seems likely however that by 2003 (our latest
outcome measure) this money was spent as well.
We were unable to obtain these data at the school level. The data collected by
26Beerends and Van der Ploeg are however not very suitable for further empirical
analysis. First of all, no information was collected among schools which did not
receive the personnel subsidy. Second, the share of schools that responded to the
interview is very small.
Computer spending
A comparable study as the one conducted by Beerends and Van der Ploeg for the
personnel subsidy, is not available for the computer subsidy. We therefore col-
lected information about computer use by sending out a brief questionnaire to 171
schools belonging to DS±5.14 This was done in the Spring of 2003. After hav-
ing approached non-respondents of the written questionnaire by telephone, we ob-
tained information from 153 schools.15 Sixty-three of these schools were eligible
for the computer subsidy; 90 were not. The questionnaire contained no more than
6 questions to keep the effort required from respondents as small as possible (we
believe that this contributed to the high response rate). The questions asked about:
the number of pupils in highest three grade levels; the number of computers in the
school available for these pupils; the age of the computers; and the average num-
bers of hours per week pupils in the highest three grade levels make use of these
computers in total and separately for language and math.16
Table 7 reports, for the computer use variables, the mean values and standard
deviations separately for the treated and non-treated groups. It also reports the dif-
ferences with and without controlling for the share of disadvantaged pupils. These
14Notice that this number of schools exceeds the schools in DS±5 in the analysis of achievement.
The reason is that we also sent the questionnaire to schools that did not participate in the nationwide
test.
15This implies a response rate of almost 0.90. This is even a lower bound on the actual response
rate because some schools may have closed down between October 1999 (the pupil count date for
the computer subsidy) and May/June 2003 (when we interviewed the schools).
16Before we designed the questionnaire, we visited some schools and talked to the headmasters in
order to ﬁnd out what could reasonably be asked. Based on this experience we concluded that it was
not sensible to ask questions about how up-to-date the schools’ software is. Consequently, we have
no information on this although schools could spend the computer subsidy on software.
27differences and their standard errors are from a WLS-regression of the row vari-
able on a dummy for treatment (and the share of disadvantaged pupils), where the
reported numbers of pupils in the three highest grades are the weights.
The ﬁrst rows in the table show no signiﬁcant differences between treated and
non-treated schools in terms of the computer-pupil ratio and the average age of the
computers. The computer-pupil ratio is slightly higher and the computers slightly
newer among treated schools than among non-treated schools, but this is reversed
when we control for the share of minority pupils. Hence, there are no signiﬁcant
ﬁrst-stage effects of the subsidy on the computer-pupil ratio and the age of com-
puters.
It is important to note that, independently of the computer subsidy, schools
already have nearly one computer for every ﬁve pupils. This is high compared to
the ”ofﬁcial” target of the government to have one computer for every ten pupils
in primary schools. It seems that the hardware needs of the schools in both groups
are already satisﬁed. The computer subsidy is not used to buy more computers or
to replace old computers by newer ones.
Although the subsidy does not seem to improve the computer hardware re-
sources in the treatment schools, the next three rows of Table 7 reveal that pupils
in the treatment group do spend more time using a computer than pupils in the
control group. Controlling for the share of minority pupils, the difference amounts
to slightly over ﬁfty minutes per pupil per week. This difference is signiﬁcant at
the 5%-level. Although in absolute terms this is a small effect, relative it is quite
substantial. Twenty minutes of this difference are allocated to language, and ten
minutes to math. These latter disaggregated estimates lack precision.
The observation that treated schools did not spend their subsidy on hardware
combined with the ﬁnding that pupils of treated schools use a school-computer
more frequently, suggests that the subsidy has been spend to buy software or in-
28Table 7: Effect of eligibility of computer subsidy in various intermediate variables
Control Treatment (2)-(1) (2)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Computer-pupil ratio 0.173 0.190 0.017 −0.018
(0.093)( 0.102)( 0.016)( 0.033)
Age of computers (in years) 2.574 2.425 −0.149 0.028
(1.461)( 1.398)( 0.239)( 0.493)
Computer use (hours p/w):
-Total 1.543 1.643 0.100 0.851
(1.208)( 1.234)( 0.205)( 0.418)
-Language 0.637 0.783 0.147 0.326
(0.657)( 0.739)( 0.116)( 0.239)
-Arithmetics 0.461 0.496 0.035 0.149
(0.396)( 0.392)( 0.067)( 0.139)
Controlling for s99 No Yes
vested in Internet connections.
6 Conclusion
This study evaluates two subsidies in primary education. One subsidy provides ex-
tra resources to improve teachers’ working conditions. The other gives additional
funding mainly for computers and software. Both subsidy schemes specify a cut-
off level of disadvantaged pupils (differently deﬁned) of 70 percent below which
schools receive no extra funding. All schools with at least 70 percent disadvan-
taged pupils receive the same amounts per teacher or per pupil independent of the
exact share of disadvantaged pupils. The cutoff at 70 percent was maintained quite
strictly, and manipulation of shares by schools was not possible as the shares of
disadvantaged pupils were determined on the basis of information from years prior
to the announcement of the subsidies. Due to these features the cutoffs provide
very convincing opportunities to evaluate the effects of these two subsidies.
The point estimates of the effects of both the personnel subsidy and the com-
29puter subsidy on achievement of 8th graders on language, arithmetics and informa-
tion processing are negative. For the personnel subsidy these are in most cases not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. For the computer subsidy we ﬁnd more evidence
of negative effects.
The personnel was mainly spent on extra payments for current teachers and
on recruiting and hiring extra teachers. While schools could have conditioned the
extra payment on performance, this is not what they did. Consequently, the extra
payment for current teachers does not provide an incentive to teachers to perform
better so that pupils’ achievement increases. Recruitment and hiring extra teachers
potentially has a beneﬁcial impact on pupils’ achievement. That this is not corrob-
orated by our ﬁndings is probably due to the fact that the schools targeted by the
personnel subsidy already have sufﬁcient (personnel) resources. Recall that in the
main funding scheme for Dutch primary schools, minority pupils have a weight of
1.9 times the weight of a non-disadvantaged pupil. A school with say 200 pupils of
whom 150 are minority receives from the main funding scheme the same personnel
budget as a school with 317 non-disadvantaged pupils.17 Where the pupil-teacher
ratio in entirely non-disadvantaged schools equals 22, this ratio will be below 14 at
the school with 75 percent disadvantaged pupils. In this situation it is unlikely that
hiring a new teacher will result in a further reduction of average class-size. The
most direct channel to increase pupils’ achievement is then not used and a boost in
achievement is less likely.
From the evidence provided above it seems that the computer subsidy was not
used to invest in extra computers or to replace old ones. Given this, and the fact
that pupils in treatment schools spend more time in school using a computer, we
infer that the computer subsidy was used to buy new software or invest in Internet
connections. One might be tempted to attribute the non-positive effect of this in-
17The funding scheme gives no compensation for the ﬁrst 9 percent of weighted students.
30tervention to the limited amount of time elapsed between the intervention and the
measurement of the outcomes. This is however contradicted by our ﬁnding that the
effect is more negative two years than one year after the intervention. To explain
the negative impact of computers on test scores, Angrist and Lavy (2002) suggest
that instruction methods using computers are less effective than other instruction
methods. Our results provide additional support for this view.
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